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PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD OF STATE SECURITIES
REGULATION: A PREVIEW OF WESTERN AIR LINES I
by
Jerome E. Weinstein*
STATEMENT
A troublesome problem in the field of state securities regulation is
the extent to which any particular "blue sky law" does regulate, and, in
fact, constitutionally can regulate a so-called "transaction effected without
entering the state."" This problem has become particularly acute recently
because of the decision of the California Superior Court in Western Air
Lines, Inc v. Stephenson, Comm'r., a decision which has far-reaching im-
plications.!
The transactions to be analyzed are grouped into two categories. The
first category involves the problem of whether an offer or sale effected in
a state solely via the mails, or some interstate facility, by a foreign issuer
or broker, is covered by that state's securities law; and, if so, whether that
statute is constitutional! The second category involves this question:
where a foreign corporation amends its certificate of incorporation to
change the rights of its shareholders, and where all or nearly all of the
steps necessary to accomplish this change are effected beyond the borders
of the state which seeks to regulate, can that state demand that the corpo-
ration apply for and be granted a permit before such a change is finally
*A. B., B. A. (Cantab.), LL. B., Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
'LOSS & CowmrT, BLUE SKY LAW 210 (1958); Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the
Blue Sky Laws, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 209 (1957); Cowett, Reorganizations, Consolidations,
Mergers and Related Corporate Events under the Blue Sky Law, 13 Bus. Lawyer 418, 760(1958); Reese and Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and
the Impact of Pull Faith and Credit, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1958); Jennings, The Role
of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob.
193, 220 (1958); Sterling, Amendments to California Corporations Laws, 1937: Readjust-
ing Stock Structure, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 76, 86 (1937); Smith, State 'Blue Sky' Laws and the
Federal Securities Acts, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1135, 1141 (1936); Klagsbrunn, Regulation of
Interstate Security Sales-A Recent Report, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 88 (1933).
" File No. LA-5822, Calif. Div. of Corps., Feb. 5, 1958, rev'd, No. 696597, Calif.
Super. Ct., L. A. County, July 17, 1958, CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. para. 70, 396. An appeal,
presently pending, was about to be heard as this article went to print.
This problem has arisen in a few reported decisions: Traveller's Health Ass'n v.
Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949),
aff'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917);
Bartlett v. Doherty, 10 F. Supp. 465 (D. N.H. 1935,) afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 81
F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1936), cert. denied sub nom. Doherty v. Knowlton, 298 U.S. 676
(1936).
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adopted on the ground that there are resident shareholders to protect? In
Western Air Lines the change which the Delaware corporation sought to
adopt was an elimination of cumulative voting. In Western States Petro-
leum Co,4 the Delaware corporation sought to effectuate a plan of merger.
In both cases, all or nearly all' of the steps necessary to effect the change
culminating in the charter amendment occurred outside California, and in
both cases the commissioner of corporations demanded a permit. Thus, in
both categories the inquiry will be directed first at a construction of the
statute to see whether in its terms these transactions are covered; and,
second at the constitutional problems involved when a state statute is so
interpreted to permit regulation.
The purpose of this article is not to examine the case of the sale or
exchange of securities with contacts in two or more states, and the conflicts
problem of what law governs the validity of that sale.' Furthermore, it is
not necessary to consider whether a state can regulate where the vendor or
offeror enters the state and carries on negotiations leading to a sale either
within that state or elsewhere; this seems to be constitutionally permissi-
' File No. LA-16541, Calif. Div. of Corps., Dec. 8, 1959. This case did not reach the
courts since the permit was issued.
'There was proxy solicitation in California in Wester Air Lines; the effect of this on
the power of California to regulate will be examined below.
*Most states follow the rule that the law of the place of contract governs, or the place
where the last act necessary to make a binding contract occurs. RESTATEMENT, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, §5 311, 332 (1934); Brocalsa Chemical Co. v. Langsenkamp, 32 F.2d
725 (6th Cir. 1929); Lack v. Borsum, 44 F. Supp. 47 (W.D.La. 1942); Hohn v. Peters,
216 Cal. 406, 14 P.2d 519 (1932); Leven v. Legarra, 103 Cal. App.2d 319, 229 P.2d 383(1951); People ex rel. Brundage v. Hill Top Metals Mining Co., 300 Il1. 564, 133 N.E.
303 (1921); Duke v. Olson, 240 11. App. 198 (1926); Carolina Palisades Inc. v. Manley,
214 Ind. 565, 16 N.E.2d 886 (1938); Somers v. Commercial Finance Corp., 245 Mass.
286, 139 N.E. 837 (1923); Guynn v. Shulters, 223 Miss. 232, 78 So.2d 114 (1955);
Gales v. Weldon, 282 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1955); McManus v. Fulton, 85 Mont. 170, 278
Pac. 126 (1929); Rhines v. Skinner Packing Co., 108 Neb. 105, 187 N.W. 874 (1922);
Russell v. Ruffcorn, 54 Nev. 162, 10 P.2d 632 (1932); Gillespie v. Blood, 81 Utah 306,
17 P.2d 822 (1932); United States Bond & Finance Corp., v. National Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d 758 (1932); Coral Gables Corp. v. Clay, 153 Va. 554, 149
S.E. 519 (1929); Estate of Suckow, 192 Wis. 124, 212 N.W. 280 (1927); GOODRICH,
HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS S5 107, 110 (3d ed. 1949); FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 5 6742 (repl. vol. 1954); 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 332.57
(1935).
There is some authority for choosing the law of the place of performance to govern:
Persen v. National City Co., 129 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Motor Products Mfg.
Corp., 90 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1937); Los Angeles Fisheries, Inc. v. Crook, 47 F.2d 1031(9th Cir. 1931); Robbins v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 8 Cal.2d 241, 65 P.2d 42 (1937);
Jones v. Re-Mine Oil Co., 47 Cal. App.2d 832, 119 P.2d 219 (1941); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICTS OF LAWS, 5 332, comment b. (1934).
There is also some authority for fixing the law of the place of the offer as the govern-
ing law: Intermountain Title Guaranty Co. v. Egbert, 52 Idaho 402, 16 P.2d 390 (1932);
Lewis v. Bricker, 235 Mich. 656, 209 N.W. 832 (1926); Streissguth v. Chase Securities
Corp., 198 Minn. 17, 268 N.W. 638 (1936); or, the law having the most "contacts" with
the contract: Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Industries, Inc., 239 F.2d 716 (2d
Cir. 1956); W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); WST-
LAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 212 (7th ed. 1925).
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ble.! The real problem is that situation where a foreign corporation never
enters the regulating state, and yet effects either an offer or a sale there,
or some change in the rights of resident shareholders.
This problem concerns the power to regulate transactions without
entering the state, and is to be distinguished from the problem of enforce-
ment-topics which are often confused.8 Although the recent decisions
on the question of enforcement by substituted process on the non-resident
indicate a broadening concept of state jurisdiction,' it is wise at the outset
to separate the due process tests sustaining substituted service, and the con-
stitutional tests sustaining a power to regulate. The problem of enforce-
ment by extradition as well as by substituted service is beyond the scope
of this article.1"
'See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917);
cf. Gillis v. Pan American Western Pet. Co., 3 Cal.2d 249, 44 P.2d 311 (1935); London,
Paris & American Bank v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 601 (9th Cir. 1902); Biddle v. Smith, 148
Tenn. 489, 256 S.W. 453 (1923).
'See Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n,
339 U.S. 643 (1950), in which the majority confuses the two problems. The dissenting
opinion did attempt to distinguish them: "We are not dealing here with the power of
Virginia to regulate the transaction of insurance business with its citizens, as was the case
in Osborn v. Ozlin . . . and Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen. . . . In the case at bar we are only
concerned with how Virginia may enforce such power as it has." Id. at 659.
'The cases indicate a trend that jurisdiction will be sustained to enter a judgment on
substituted service in an action against a non-resident even in a case arising out of an
isolated transaction effected via the mails: McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957); Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S.2d
418 (1953). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) where substituted service
on a non-resident was not sustained in a case where the "contact" with the serving state was
both isolated and unconnected with the dispute. See also Traveller's Health Ass'n v.
Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263(1949), afI'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310(1945); Schutt v. Commercial Travellers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1956);
Florence Nightingale School of Nursing v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App.2d 74, 335 P.2d
240 (1959); Flynn v. Physicians Casualty Ass'n, 20 Conn. Supp. 240, 131 A.2d 336(1957). But see Anschell v. Sackheim, 145 F.Supp. 447 (D. N.J. 1956); Insull v. New
York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F.Supp. 615 (N.D. II1. 1959); Putnam v. Triangle
Publications, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957). The latter two cases are libel cases hold-
ing that a foreign publishing corporation is not "doing business" in a state for purposes of
substituted service simply because its periodicals are sold in the state.
1 The extradition clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 2, cl. 2, provides that
"A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from
Justice and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive authority of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction
of the Crime." If the person was not in the State at the time the crime was committed he
would not be a fugitive from justice under the clause: Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691(1903); Ex parte Shoemaker, 25 Cal. App. 551, 144 Pac. 985 (1914); Ex parte Heath,
87 Mont. 370, 287 Pac. 636 (1930). This problem may not prove fatal since nearly all
of the states have passed the UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT. For example, ALA.
CODE tit. 15 SS 48 to 75 (1940): "The governor of this state may also surrender on de-
mand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged on
indictment found in such other state with committing an act in this state intentionally re-
sulting in a crime in such other state, and the provisions of this article not otherwise
1961]
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are at least four clauses of the Constitution which are relevant
in determining whether a state can regulate a transaction effected within
the state, where the defendant issuer or broker, as the case may be, has
never entered the state."1 These clauses are the contract clause, the com-
merce clause, the due process clause, and the full faith and credit clause.
The Contract Clause
It has been held in the case of a common-law sale within the regu-
lating state (sale A) that the securities law is not constitutional within the
purview of the contract clause."2 The transactions to be examined here
also include a sale within the state, and at least in the first category to be
examined, a contract in the common law sense of an offer, acceptance and
consideration; but effected in such a way that the issuer or dealer does not
enter the state (sale B). In an effort to discover on what constitutional
grounds regulation of sale B might be attacked, it is perhaps not enough
to say either that it is different from sale A or that sale B, and not sale A,
is within the protection of the contract clause. Where it is necessary to
distinguish between sales made in the state, any constitutional argument
must advance the reasons why sale B should be immune from state regu-
lation. One such reason is that the state seeking to regulate does not have
a sufficient "governmental interest" or contact with the transaction; i.e., it
belongs to Congress (commerce clause) or to another state (full faith and
credit clause) to regulate; or whoever can regulate, state X can not (due
process). The other clauses are necessary to supply the added constitu-
tional ballast to weigh in the scales against the police power, to attempt a
differentiation between sale A and sale B, and to explain why the latter
and not the former may be constitutionally protected. Most of the cases
inconsistent shall apply in such cases notwithstanding that the accused was not in that state
at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom." See Timbers
and Pollack, Extradition from Canada to the U.S. for Securities Fraud: Prustration of the
National Policies of Both Countries, 16 Fed. B. J. 31 (1956). For a general discussion
of the enforcement problems arising out of Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of
Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), aff'd, 339 U.S.
643 (1950), see Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 482 (1951).
" In Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n,
339 U.S. 643, 651 (1950), mention is made in the majority opinion of a constitutional
argument based on an infringement of the federal control of the mails. However, since
that argument was not included in appellant's brief on submission of the case, the Court
did not address itself to that point. It is suggested, however, that the clause on the mails
adds little, if anything, to an argument based on the commerce clause. The argument based
on the mails was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia: Traveller's Health
Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d
263 (1949).
"tIn re MacLean, 147 Kan. 678, 78 P.2d 855 (1938); Commissioner of Banks v.
Chase Securities Corp., 298 Mass. 285, 10 N.E.2d 472 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S.
660 (1938); State v. Nordstrom, 169 Minn. 214, 210 N.W. 1001 (1926).
[VCol. X
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which involve prohibitions on the state for "reaching out" beyond its juris-
diction in an area not competent for it to legislate, and which contain ref-
erences to the contract clause, also contain references to full faith and
credit and due process.'
The Commerce Clause
The commerce clause is also of doubtful assistance in developing a
constitutional argument against regulation of transactions without enter-
ing the state. Whenever a state is held incompetent to apply its law to an
interstate transaction on the ground of the commerce clause, it is not be-
cause the law of another state is applicable, but because the law of no state
is applicable-"regulation of inter-state commerce being committed by
the Constitution to the Federal Government.""
In considering whether a transaction without entering the state is the
type of transaction which can only be regulated by the federal government,
it should be noted that Congress in five out of the six statutes administered
by the SEC has made specific provisions preserving the blue sky laws."'
Moreover, even before these specific provisions were enacted, the Supreme
Court in a series of cases decided that the commerce clause did not impede
a state from regulating securities transactions within the state, even though
in one case the securities dealer merely directed offers into the state by
means of interstate facilities, and never himself entered the state."6
Therefore, although the federal statutes do not in so many words say
that the states are left with the power to regulate the transaction without
"'Bayard v. Traders General Ins. Co., 99 F.Supp. 343 (W.D.La. 1951); Holderness
v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. 54 F.Supp. 145 (S.D.Fla. 1944). See also Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924). For a detailed examination of the contract clause see
Hale, The Supreme Court and Contract Clause, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944).
", Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 Minn.
L. Rev. 161, 165 (1931).11Securities Act 5 18, 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 5 77r (1958); Securities
Exchange Act 5 28(a), 48 STAT. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. S 78bb(a) (1958); Public
Utility Holding Company Act § 21, 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U.S.C. S 79u (1958);
Trust Indenture Act § 326, 53 STAT. 1177 (1939), 15 U.S.C. S 77zzz (1958); Invest-
ment Company Act S 50, 54 STAT. 846 (1940), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-4 9 (1958). The Inter-
state Commerce Act § 20a, 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U.S.C. S 20a (1958), gives the ICC
exclusive power to regulate the issuance of securities by any carrier subject to its jurisdic-
tion. Mr. Cowett states that this pre-emption in the latter act has not been followed,
because some states for some unknown reason require registration of securities of carriers
subject to the ICC. Cowett, supra note 1, at 764.
"6Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). The foreign partnership in
this case was one of a number of complainants seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the
Michigan blue sky law. The court sustained the constitutionality of the statute without
expressly dealing with the special problem raised by the type of business in which this
partnership was engaged. Moreover, the decision from this point of view is even less
satisfactory since the court merely said: "Answer to the contention that the statute is an
interference with inter-state commerce we leave to our opinion in (Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1916)1." Id. at 590.
1961]
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entering the state, blue sky laws are preserved generally, and there is at
least one decision-although without reasoning on the point-holding
that state regulation of this transaction is not contrary to the commerce
clause." Moreover, even in the second category of transactions effected by
charter amendments, the competition would appear to be between two or
more state schemes of regulation, rather than competition between a state
and the federal government. 8 Thus, this article will examine in greater
detail the implications of the due process and the full faith and credit
clauses as to both categories.
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
The test which appears to be applied when due process is argued in
a case involving legislative jurisdiction is as follows: does the forum have
a sufficient "governmental interest" to justify its action; or, as one distin-
guished commentator has phrased it: "Does the state have a legitimate
interest in the application of its policy?"'" This point of view has consid-
erable case law support."0
The more troublesome question today, however, is whether the full
faith and credit clause says any more than the due process clause. There
are, for example, a number of commentators who think that the same test
applies to both."' They say that the full faith and credit clause and the due
,See Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), af'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). But see two
unofficial opinions of the securities commissioners of Idaho and South Carolina who believe
that if this type of offer or sale is covered by any of the statutes administered by the SEC,
then their respective state statutes cannot be applied. Letter from R. U. Spaulding, Commis-
sioner of Finance, State of Idaho, to the author, Jan. 22, 1960; Letter from R. L. Kelly,
Securities Commissioner, State of South Carolina, to the author, March 16, 1960. All
correspondence to the author has been turned over to the Harvard Law School Library.
1 See Western Air Lines v. Stephenson, Comm'r, CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. para. 70,396
(Calif. Super. Ct., L. A. County, July 17, 1958).
"Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interest and the
judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 49 (1958). For other articles in general accord
with the conclusion stated in the text see: Reese and Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1129;
Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev.
339, 342 (1952); Hilpert and Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, 25
Wash. U.L.Q. 27, 50, 55 (1939).
'Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); National Ins. Co. v.
Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918);
Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149
(1914); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Sun Life Ins. Office Ltd. v.
Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959); Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp.
145 (S.D. Fla. 1944). Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934)
has been criticized in that it overlooked the "governmental interest" of Mississippi, the
place where the loss occurred. Currie, supra note 19, at 44-46. See also in this connection
Bayard v. Traders and Cen. Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951).
" Currie, supra note 19 at 49; Currie, The Constitution and the Transitory Cause of
Action, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 36, 42 (1959); Reese, supra note 19, at 342; Moore and Oglebay,
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process clause complement each other in choice of law situations involving
the statute law of sister states. Thus, if a state with no "governmental
interest" applies its own statute to a transaction, it is a denial of due proc-
ess; and, if at the same time they refuse to apply the statute of a sister state
which is based on a sufficient "governmental interest", it is a denial of full
faith and credit."' Other writers have taken the position that the full faith
and credit clause requires the court to weigh the relevant national and state
interests and to choose the law of that state with the superior interest.22
Although a reading of the relevant decisions in this area does not provide
a clear answer to this problem, the majority of the cases can be explained
on the first test.' In one area, in particular, although the courts give "lip
service" to the "weighing of interests" test, it is becoming increasingly
clear that the courts will allow the forum to apply its own law, simply on
a showing that the forum has a sufficient interest in the transaction in
question; this is in the area of workmen's compensation. 5
The Supreme Court and Pull Faith and Credit, 29 Va. L. Rev. 557, 609 (1943); Hilpert
and Cooley, supra note 19, at 41-43. See STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLicrS OF
LAWs 67-68 (2d ed. 1951).
" See note 21 mupra. It is important to remember that "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given . . . to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State."
U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 1. This has been interpreted to mean that full faith and credit
will be given to the statute-law of a sister state: Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, 214
U.S. 19 (1909); 62 STAT. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. S 1738 (1958). Moreover, there
is a growing body of opinion which says that full faith and credit must also be
given to the decisional law of a sister-state: Currie, supra note 19, at 15-16 cf. Holder-
ness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944). Similarly,
writers have felt that a state may deprive a party of due process by applying the common
law of any state having no interest in the matter: Hilpert and Cooley, supra note 19, at
54-58; Currie, suapra note 19, at 16; cf. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933). These last
two problems will not present any difficulties here, since the categories of cases to be
discussed will involve only statutory law, and it is settled that due process will upset an
improper application of the statutory law of the forum and full faith and credit will upset
a failure to apply the properly controlling statute of a sister-state. See note 20 supra and
note 24 infra.
"'Reese and Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1132; Comment, Full Faith and Credit to
Statutes, 45 Yale L. J. 339 (1935); Holt, Full Faith and Credit---A Suggested Approach
to the Problem of Recognition of Foreign Corporations, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 453, 478 (1941);
see Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 437-8
(1950); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit--the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1945).
" Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Klaxon v. Stentor Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941); John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Metropolitan
Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935); Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 112 (1934); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leibing, 259 U.S.
209 (1922); Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.S. 386 (1910); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900).
" In Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), a New Hampshire court
was compelled to give full faith and credit to a Vermont workmen's compensation act,
although the injury was caused in New Hampshire. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), it was held where the contract of employment was
entered into in California, the injury occurring in Alaska, notwithstanding that the contract
recited that the employee was to be bound by the Alaska compensation statute, that due
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There are two other areas in which the full faith and credit clause
has been applied. Neither of these is clearly explicable on the first test;
that is, in both areas it would appear that the courts are first considering
the legitimate concern of the forum and the sister-state, as well as a na-
tional concern for uniformity; second, weighing them, and last, choosing
the law representing the superior interest. In the first line of cases, it has
been held that full faith and credit demands that the liability of a share-
holder of a corporation for corporate debts, and the manner in which it
may be enforced, are governed solely by the statutes of the state of incor-
poration. Such liability cannot be increased, nor a different remedy given,
by the statutes of any other state in which the corporation may do busi-
ness.2" Unfortunately, the authority of these cases has been lessened some-
what by a series of contrary decisions permitting application of shareholder
liability statutes of states other than that of incorporation."
The second line of cases has consistently held that the rights of mem-
bers of a fraternal and beneficiary society must be determined by the law
of the state of the society's incorporation. 8 These cases have been heavily
process and full faith and credit were not violated by an application of California law. The
court (Id. at 547-8), however, applied a "weighing" test. Bradford was distinguished in
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1938) where it was held that
California did not have to give full faith and credit to a Massachusetts compensation statute
where the injury occurred in California. In Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), it was
similarly held that the state where the worker was injured could award him damages although
the compensation act of the state where the contract of employment was made and the parties
resided purported to give an exclusive remedy. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp.,
348 U.S. 66 (1954); Mr. Currie in an examination of these cases, supra note 19, at 26-27,
distinguishes Bradford from the subsequent cases by saying that the former case was one of
wrongful death and the latter were cases of personal injury, and he argues that in Bradford
New Hampshire had no interest in the application of its wrongful death statute. This effects
a harmonization of this case with the first test, but it is admitted to be a "latter-day
rationalization."
20 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243
(1912); Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner, 163 Fed. 605 (S.D. Tex. 1908). See
Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953).
27 Thomas v. Mathiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144
(1901). See Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 158 Cal. 275, 110 Pac. 942 (1910). In
Thomas v. Matthiessen, supra at 235, the court did not apply the rule that the liability of a
stockholder is to be determined solely by the charter and laws of the incorporating state.
The court said that since the corporation was authorized to do business in California, the
shareholder must be deemed to have given his consent to its doing business there. "He
knew that California had laws and he took his risk of what they might be, when ...he
gave his assent to doing business there." In Coleman, supra note 23, at 478, the author
attempts to reconcile the cases on a "weighing of interests" approach: ". . . the cases are
... consistent with the theory that a state other than that of incorporation is under a duty
to give full faith and credit to the immunity from personal liability granted a shareholder
by the statute of the state of incorporation, unless some interest is shown in imposing per-
sonal liability that is superior to the interest of the state of incorporation in granting im-
munity from such liability."
Order of United Commercial Travellers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Sovereign
Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Modern Woodman v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925);
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
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criticized by those advocates of the first test;2" and, it is true both that the
most recent decision embodying the rule for beneficiary societies was a 5-4
decision of the Supreme Court,"0 and that the rule was successfully avoided
by a decision in the sixth circuit."' However, Wolfe, and the cases which
it followed, are significant for the purposes of this study for this reason:
they demonstrate that the Supreme Court, when faced with the problem
of whether a state should be compelled to give full faith and credit to the
statutes of another state, will, in certain types of transactions, consider the
national concern for the application of a uniform law, and will, when the
occasion calls for it, direct all states to apply that uniform law.
OFFERS AND SALES EFFECTED IN A STATE VIA THE MAILS
The Case Law
In Merrick v. Halsey & Co.82 the question presented was the validity
of the Michigan blue sky law. The persons bringing the suit to enjoin the
enforcement of the statute consisted of a considerable number of corpora-
tions, partnerships and individuals. These complainants alleged that the
statute was unconstitutional as contrary to due process and to the com-
merce and cruel and unusual punishment clauses; and that the statute con-
sisted of an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Michican Securi,
ties Commission.8" Among those contesting was Remick, Hodges Com-
pany, a partnership. Remick and Hodges were both residents of New York,
and March, a third partner, was a resident of New Jersey. Their office was
in New York City, and they were engaged in the business of buying and
selling stock, bonds and other securities. They carried on business in New
York and elsewhere through agents and by means of the mails. The part-
nership had no place of business in Michigan and were not at the time of
this suit sending agents into the state. However, they had been offering
and were offering securities for sale to customers in the state of Michigan
by mail, telegraph or telephone." The court held (Mr. Justice McReyn-
olds dissenting) that the Michigan blue sky law was a valid exercise of the
police power of the state, and was not unconstitutional under the four-
"Currie, supra note 19 at 49, 52, 76. Mr. Currie's main objection to an interest
weighing approach is that it turns the courts into miniature legislatures. The role of the
courts, he believes, should be confined to an inquiry into whether the state seeking to apply
its law, has a "legitimate interest in the application of its policy." Note, Full Faith and
Credit: Preferential Treatment of Fraternal Insurers, 57 Yale L. J. 139, 141 (1947).
" Order of United Commercial Travellers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
8 Order of United Commercial Travellers v. Duncan, 221 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1955).
" 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
"Id. at 570-571.
" Id. at 572-573. See opinion delivered to the Investment Bankers Association of
America, by its counsel, Reed & McCook of New York, in ELUOIrr, THE ANNOTATED
BLUE SKY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 34-44 (1919), and in REED & WASHBURN,
BLUE SKY LAWS, ANALYSIS AND TEXT 255a-267a (1921).
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teenth amendment, the commerce clause, or as an unconstitutional dele-
gation of power."'
No consideration was given to the special problem raised by the New
York partnership. The case, therefore, amounts to a blanket validation of
the Michigan blue sky law even as applied to offers effected in a state
solely by use of the mails or other interstate facilities. Although the court
did not give any special attention to this transaction, it was believed by a
number of practitioners at that time, that the court definitely meant what
it was saying. For example, the opinion of counsel, referred to above,"'
states:
Our conclusion on this point, therefore, is that if the Blue Sky Laws
were constitutional in their entirety and as they seem to be construed by the
State officials, the offering of securities by mail or telegraph, or even by
telephone, from outside the State would constitute a violation of the law and
be indictable and punishable as such in the State."'
The opinion also refers to the problem of advertisements:
The conclusion above stated necessarily applies to advertisements in
papers published in the Blue Sky State, the papers being in legal effect a
medium through which the offering is made to the investor. It would seem
also to apply though with manifest difficulties in its application, to advertise-
ments in papers or magazines published in other States and circulating in
the Blue Sky States. We say with manifest difficulties in its application,
because in a criminal prosecution it would, we hope, be impossible to convict
a dealer for an advertisement in a Springfield, Illinois, paper, a few copies of
which without his knowledge, or intent, found their way into Iowa. On the
other hand, an advertisement in a Chicago paper made with knowledge of
its wide circulation in Michigan .. .would seem to constitute an intended
offering of the security in those states, as would also an adversisement in a
national magazine known to circulate in all or most of the states."
Wrigley Pharmaceutical Co. v. Cameron"" was decided nine years
"Id. at 589-590. See note 16 supra on the special problem raised by the commerce
clause.
' See note 34 supra.
7 ELLIOTT, op. cit. supra note 34, at 38.
SB See note 37 supra.
"16 F.2d 290 (M.D. Pa. 1926); Klagsbrunn, Regulation of Interstate Security Sales-
A Recent Report, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 88, 89. See also Duke v. Olson, 240 Ill. App. 198
(1926). This was a suit brought to enforce double liability of a stockholder of a bank
under a Washington statute. The defendant contended, inter alia, that the stock was sold
to him in violation of the blue sky law of Illinois. The facts were that one J., saw a
circular in his office at Chicago, soliciting sales of securities, inquiries to be directed to
Tacoma, Washington. J. induced the defendant to buy, defendant agreed, and J. wired the
bank for fifteen shares (five for himself and ten for defendant). The bank acknowledged
receipt and sent subscription blanks to J. J. was not an agent of the bank. The court
merely said, as to this point, "Under similar circumstances, it was held that there was no
violation of the Blue Sky Law. People v. Hill Top Metals Min. Co., 300 Ill. 564." Id. at
206. An examination of People ex rel. Brundage v. Hill Top Metals Mining Co., 300 II.
564, 133 N.E. 303 (1921), indicates that the court in Duke treated this transaction as a
sale made in Washington; and, on the majority view that the validity of a contract is de-
termined by the law of the place of contracting, Illinois law was inapplicable; it was merely
the place where the sale was solicited. The court is not saying, however, that an offer to
sell securities directed into Illinois would not be a violation of the statute, even though
via the mails.
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later. The plaintiff in that case was a Delaware corporation with an office
in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The president of the corporation was a citi-
zen of Pennsylvania and an inhabitant of Philadelphia. The defendants
were the commissioner of banking and the attorney-general of Pennsyl-
vania. Wrigley had been engaged in the sale of tooth paste and treasury
stock to inhabitants of Pennsylvania by use of circulars sent through the
mails from Atlantic City to the Pennsylvania residents. When the com-
missioner of banking issued a subpoena to the president and vice-president,
requiring their presence for an examination pursuant to the Pennsylvania
securities law, the officers refused to appear, and instead filed a bill to
restrain the defendants from prosecuting any civil or criminal action under
the statute because it was in violation of the commerce clause of the Con-
stitution."0 The court dismissed the action as premature, for the reason
that it was impossible to determine that it was the intention of the authori-
ties of Pennsylvania to undertake any direct interference with interstate
commerce." However, the court did express itself on how it would prob-
ably treat the case, if it were not premature. Citing Merrick, it said that
". .. it is clear that the Pennsylvania Securities Act cannot be attacked on
the ground that it is an unlawful interference with interstate commerce.""
This case is vulnerable for three reasons: (1) The statement of the
court as to the constitutionality of the statute amounts only to a dictum.
(2) It is not entirely clear from the opinion whether the mail order busi-
ness was carried on solely via the mails (the president and vice-president
were both citizens of Pennsylvania). (3) The court, as in Merrick, did
not address itself to the specific problem of offers effected in the state
solely via the mails. However, the implication of the decision is that the
statute covered this type of transaction (assuming it was carried on solely
via the mails), and that there was no constitutional objection.
Then in Bartlett v. Doherty,' the court dealt separately with two
transactions. In the first transaction, the plaintiffs had given orders in New
Hampshire for the purchase of stock from the defendant, having been
solicited by an agent of the defendant who was physically in the state. In
the second transaction one of the plaintiffs, Bartlett, called the defendant's
Boston office by telephone for information concerning some stock pre-
viously purchased. The call was referred to the New Hampshire agent
who at that time was present in the Boston office. The agent urged Bart-
"16 F.2d at 291.
Id. at 296.
42 Ibid.
" 10 F. Supp. 465 (D. N.H. 1935), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 81 F.2d 920 (Ist
Cir. 1936), cert. denied sub nom. Doherty v. Knowlton, 298 U.S. 676 (1936).
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lett to buy more stock. The plaintiff agreed and mailed a check to the
Boston office. The stock was delivered and accepted by the plaintiff in
New Hampshire."' The action arose when the plaintiffs sought to recover
money paid for the stocks which they alleged were sold in violation of the
New Hampshire blue sky law. That law provided: "No salesman or agent
shall in this state, in behalf of any dealer, sell, offer for sale or invite offers
for or inquiries about securities unless registered . . ."" (Emphasis
added.) It was alleged that the New Hampshire agent was not registered.
The district court decided in favor of the plaintiffs in each case and the
defendants appealed.
As to the first transaction the court affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court. The court said that, "If an unregistered salesman or agent sold
or took orders for stock in violation of such statutes and his illegal acts
cannot be ratified by his principal, a purchaser, on offering to return his
stock and any benefit received therefrom, is entitled to recover the pur-
chase price."" However, the court reversed the district court and held the
second transaction covered by the securities act. The court said:
No act of Parent, either of solicitation or offer of sale, took place in
New Hampshire. No contract of sale, even if Parent was authorized to make
a contract of sale, was entered into by him while in New Hampshire. He
violated no provision of the New Hampshire law by soliciting a sale in
Massachusetts, where he was duly registered and authorized to solicit a sale
of securities as a representative of the defendant, Doherty."'
The decision seems to indicate that to be a violation of the statute
there must be an offer or sale in New Hampshire. There was an offer in
this case, but that offer, the court held, was made in Massachusetts, not in
New Hampshire. This interpretation of the law runs counter to the view
that a proposal is not an "offer" until it is received." The view that the
proposal is not an offer until receipt points to the place of receipt as the
place where the offer is "made".4" But here we are left with a rather strict
interpretation of the statute; that is, an offer can only be made in New
Hampshire when the offeror is physically present in that state. The court
said that "no contract of sale ...was entered into by (the agent) while
in New Hampshire.""0 (Emphasis added.) Thus, the statutory phrase "in
"81 F.2d at 921-922.
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 421:18 (1955) which makes the same provision as
stated in the text. It was admitted that the defendant was registered as a dealer under the
statute. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 421:7 (1955).
" 81 F.2d at 927.
IT Id. at 928.
" RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs S 23 (1932).
"The UNIFORM SECURITIEs AcT 5 414(c) solves the problem by saying that an
offer is "made in this state" either if it "originates from this state" or if it "is directed by
the offeror to this state."1181 F.2d at 928.
12
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this state", not only modifies ". . . sell, offer for sale . . .", but also
".. . salesman or agent . . .", so that in order to violate the New Hamp-
shire statute a salesman must actually enter the state and carry on his
negotiations there.5
It must be remembered that this is a federal court decision constru-
ing the New Hampshire statute. Even if New Hampshire still places this
restrictive interpretation on her blue sky law-binding only those defend-
ants who make sales or offers when physically present in the state-this
does not mean that a broader interpretation would be unconstitutional.
There is no indication in the case that the court was interpreting the statute
so as to make it constitutional.
Before turning to the leading case on this subject, reference might
be made to Hardy v. Musicraft Records, Inc.5" In that case, the plaintiff,
at his Los Angeles residence, received a letter forwarded from New York
from the predecessor of the defendant corporation. The letter enclosed a
purchase commitment letter for the plaintiff's use in confirming an agree-
ment to buy shares of the predecessor corporation. The plaintiff signed
the purchase commitment letter and sent it by mail from Los Angeles to
the corporation in New York. Certificates representing 5,000 shares in
the corporation were forwarded from New York to the California Bank
in Los Angeles and were eventually delivered to the plaintiff. When the
plaintiff discovered that no permit had been procured by the corporation
for the sale of its shares, this action was brought to recover the purchase
price." The court held that since the contract was made in California by
mailing the purchase commitment letter there, the validity of that con-
tract was governed by California law. The California statute, as it then
provided, stated that, "Every security issued by any company without a
permit of the commissioner authorizing the same then in effect, shall be
61 Two points should be kept in mind: first, whether the words "in this state" appear
in the statute, or not, any offer or sale which does not occur within the state cannot be con-
stitutionally regulated by a statute of that state; at least in this sense a statute can have no
extra-territorial effect. See, e.g. People v. J. 0. Beckman & Co., 347 Ill. 92, 97, 179 N.E.
435, 437 (1932). This proposition will be examined more fully in connection with the
second category of transactions to be analyzed. It is only necessary here to point out that
while in Merrick it was both assumed that the offers via the mails occurred within the state
and that the statute covered those offers, and held that the statute was constitutional, in
Doherty it was held that the offer did not occur within the state, and hence, was not covered
by the statute. Second, most of the blue sky laws contain the phrase "in this state," but,
as will be seen, the majority of blue sky administrators do not imply the same physical
presence qualification into their provisions as did the Doherty court into the New Hampshire
statute.
" 93 Cal.App.2d 698, 209 P.2d 839 (1949).
"5 Id. at 700, 209 P.2d at 840.
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void.""' The court then said that since the sale was made in violation of
the statute the transaction was void and the plaintiffs were entitled to re-
cover their money." This is another decision following Merrick but with-
out a reasoned opinion.56
The discussion of the case law on this subject ends with Traveller's
Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n."
The following is a statement of facts :5'
The appellant Traveller's Health Association was incorporated in Ne-
braska as a nonprofit membership association in 1904. Since that time its
only office has been located in Omaha, from which it has conducted a mail-
order health insurance business. New members pay an initiation fee and
obligate themselves to pay periodic assessments at the Omaha office. The
funds so solicited are used for operating expenses and sick benefits to mem-
bers. The Association has no paid agents; its new members are usually
obtained through the unpaid activities of those already members, who are
encouraged to recommend the Association to friends and submit their names
to the home office. The appellant Pratt in Omaha mails solicitations to these
prospects. He encloses blank applications which, if signed and returned
to the home office with the required fee, usually result in election of appli-
cants as members. Certificates are then mailed, subject to return within 10
days if not satisfactory. Traveller's has solicited Virginia members in this
manner since 1904, and has caused many sick benefit claims to be investi-
gated. When these proceedings were instituted it had approximately 800
Virginia members.
The Virginia Corporation Commission, determining that the activities of
Traveller's violated the state blue sky law-requiring those selling or
5'ANN. CAL. CODES, CORPORATIONS CODE S 26100 (1955) now provides: "Every
security of its own issue sold or issued by any company without a permit is void." In spite
of the language which is found in the cases that stock issued in violation of the securities
act is "void," it is well settled that such securities are merely voidable at the behest of
innocent purchasers or subsequent assignees: Eberhard v. Pac. Northwest Loan & Mortgage
Corp., 215 Cal. 226, 9 P.2d 302 (1932); Robbins v. Pac. Eastern Corp., 8 Cal.2d 241,
65 P.2d 42 (1937); Western Oil & Refining Co. v. Venago Oil Corp. 218 Cal. 733, 24
P.2d 971 (1933); Braunstein v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 780, 17 P.2d 104
(1932); Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities
Act: II, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 344, 352-353 (1946).
"Hardy v. Musicraft Records, Inc., 93 Cal.App.2d 698, 703, 209 P.2d 839, 842
(1949).
"Mention may be made of a point which is often overlooked in discussing B. C. Turf
& Country Club, Ltd. v. Daugherty, 94 Cal.App.2d 320, 210 P.2d 760 (1949), a proceed-
ing to compel the commissioner of corporations to rescind an order directing petitioner, a
Canadian corporation, to cease and desist from further sale of stock within the state. The
decisive question was whether there was a solicitation of a sale in violation of the California
statute. The court laid heavy stress on certain incidents which in their view did not amount
to "solicitation." However, they ignored an incident which occurred after the plan to sell
stock had been put into operation: "A Mr. Gilmore, a client of Fraser's [the principal
promoter] telephoned Fraser [who was in Canada] from San Francisco and asked about the
deal, and was told by Fraser about the procedure to be followed." Id. at 325, 210 P.2d at
763. Was the court treating this as de minimus, or is something being said about the
application of the California statute?
"'188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949) (Comment, 59 Yale L. J. 360 (1950); Note,
17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 382 (1950)), afl'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), Notes, 39 Calif. L. Rev.
152 (1951), 64 Harv. L. Rev. 482 (1951), Comment, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 881 (1951),
Recent Case, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245 (1950).
s 339 U.S. at 645-646.
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offering securities to obtain a permit-instituted cease and desist proceed-
ings against the insurance company and its treasurer."
The Virginia court first asks whether "the activities of the appellants
in the Commonwealth of Virginia have been such as to subject them to
the State's regulatory power."6 The court stressed the following activities
taking place in Virginia: solicitation of new members by old members,
investigations, remittances in payment of benefit claims being received
and accepted in the Commonwealth, and the sales actually being made
there. If the court had continued along this line of inquiry, a more satis-
factory reasoning for the result might have been obtained. Unfortunately,
the court mixed the question of the power to regulate with the power to
enforce, and it did not carefully segregate its authorities under one or the
other of the two issues. 1 However, despite this, the court did make a clear
state of its holding:
We hold, in view of the authorities referred to, that the evidence in
possession of the State Corporation Commission constituted good cause to
conclude that the appellants had been engaged in selling securities in Virginia
through the United States mail without complying with, and in violation of,
the provisions of the applicable laws of the state."*
It is assumed that the offers or solicitations made by the association oc-
curred within Virginia (contrary to the Doherty approach). The court
held that the sales occurred within Virginia, and apparently that these
acts within Virginia constituted violations of the blue sky law.
The opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Black,
is unsatisfactory for the same reason noted above with respect to the Vir-
ginia decision. The court said that the basic contention ". . . is that all
their activities take place in Nebraska and that consequently Virginia has
no power to reach them in cease and desist proceedings to enforce any
part of its regulatory law."6 (Emphasis added.) However, the court went
on to speak of what constitutes "doing business" justifying regulation, and
cited Osborn v. Oslin," and Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen," distinguishing Min-
5 d. at 646.
*o 188 Va. at 885, 51 S.E.2d at 265.
*' For example, the court, in seeking to refute appellant's argument that the "associa-
tion is not engaged in business activities in Virginia such as to bring them within the juris-
diction of the courts of this state," and to distinguish Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n
v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923) (a case having to do with whether an association was doing
business in Montana for purposes of substituted service) cited a service of process case, and
then cited Merrick, for the proposition that a state may regulate sales of securities through
the mails. Id. at 888-889, 51 S.E.2d at 267-268.
62Id. at 892, 51 S.E.2d at 269.
"339 U.S. at 646-647.
4'310 U.S. 53 (1940), where the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute which pro-
vided that as to casualty and surety risks in Virginia, insured against by corporations author-
ized to do business in that state, the insurance shall be through regularly constituted and
registered resident agents or agencies of such companies.
" 318 U.S. 313 (1943). The question was whether a reciprocal insurance association
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nesota Ass'n v. Benn,8 for the proposition that ". . a state's power to
regulate need not be determined by a 'conceptualistic discussion of theories
of the place of contracting or of performance.' """ Yet, at the same time
the court cites the landmark, substituted service case of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,"6 and lumping all these cases together the court con-
cludes that ". . . the contacts and ties of appellants with Virginia resi-
dents, together with that state's interest in faithful observance of the cer-
tificate obligations, justify subjecting appellants to cease and desist pro-
ceedings under §6." 0" (Emphasis added.) Further, the court says: "We
hold that Virginia's subjection of this Association to the jurisdiction of
that State's Corporation Commission in a §6 proceeding is consistent with
'fair play and substantial justice', and is not offensive to the Due Process
Clause."' (Emphasis added.)
The opinion indicates that these solicitations and sales occurred
within Virginia. Is is assumed that the Virginia blue sky law, as construed,
covers these transactions. Further, it is assumed-in view of the fact that
the opinion stresses the power to enforce to such an extent-that Virginia
constitutionally (presumably under the due process clause) has the power
to regulate these transactions. The thrust of the opinion seems directed
at disposing of the constitutional objections to the ability to enforce such
power as Virginia is assumed to have.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate concurring opinion, said that "The
requirements of due process do not, in my opinion, preclude the extension
of Virginia's regulatory scheme to appellant.""1 Furthermore, he disposed
of the objection based on the case where a policy-holder seeks to sue the
foreign company in Virginia: "His ability to sue is not necessarily the
measure of Virginia's power to regulate.""2 He said that, "Whether such
which insured against fire and related risks might be constitutionally made subject to a New
York registration law. Except for the possibility that agents might be used to investigate
risks in New York, the business of the company was carried on through the mails. The
Court held that the statute was valid and not unconstitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment. This case is distinguishable from Traveller's on the ground that, among other things,
the insurance covered property situated in New York, and the Court said that, "The states
have long had great authority over property within their borders." 318 U.S. at 318. On
the other hand, this is a case involving regulation and not enforcement, and it does indicate
how far the courts are willing to go in permitting the states to regulate business carried on
via. the mails.
" 261 U.S. 140. See n6te 61 supra.
67 399 U.S. at 648.
**326 U.S. 310 (1943).
**339 U.S. at 648.
UId. at 649.71ld. at 652.
"'Id. at 653. This distinction was also drawn in the Virginia court, where an attempt
was made to distinguish the Been case, which involved a "pecuniary civil judgment," and
Travellsr's, which was an inquiry "quasi-criminal in its approach." 188 Va. at 889. 51
S.E.2d at 267.
[Vol. X
STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
solicitation is isolated or continuous, it is activity which Virginia can regu-
late.""3 Hence, Mr. Justice Douglas held that it was not a violation of due
process for Virginia to regulate sales and offers made within the state via
the mails.
Mr. Justice Minton, joined by Mr. Justice Jackson, dissented on the
ground that the appeal was premature." He said: "I would answer the
question of due process when Virginia has attempted to apply its process
to appellants in a proceeding that has consequence of a nature which en-
titles a person to the protection of the Due Process Clause.""3 However,
he voiced an opinion as to the matter of substituted service, and said that
for such purpose, he would not hold that appellants were "present" in
Virginia. He made it clear, however, that he was discussing the power to
enforce and not the power to regulate." Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, agreed with the Court in reaching the merits, and on the
merits joined the dissent."
The case is not satisfactory for a number of reasons: (1) As has been
noted throughout the discussion of the case, the problem of regulation and
enforcement are lumped together. (2) Possibly the decision only repre-
sents that line of cases recognizing the state's special interest in regulating
the insurance business.' (3) There may be some factual distinctions, such
as the fact that the association relied on the activities of old members to
solicit new members or the fact that investigations might be made in
Virginia by the company. The Supreme Court opinion, nevertheless, is
strong authority for the proposition that a state doing a substantial amount
of business in the state has the power at least under the due process clause
to regulate offers and sales made within the state, effected by use of inter-
state facilities.
Administrative Opinions
A number of attorney general opinions have been written on the
issue of whether the particular blue sky law in question was broad enough
to cover an offer or sale effected in the state solely by use of the mails.
Those opinions vary, and many of them probably do not represent current
thinking among the present securities commissioners and administrators.7
*' 339 U.S. at 654.
'"Id. at 655.
Id. at 657.
' See note 8 supra.
339 U.S. at 659.
""In Osborn v. Ozlin . . . we recognized that a state has a legitimate interest in all
insurance policies protecting its residents against risks, an interest which the state can protect
even though the 'state action may have repercussions beyond state lines....'" Id. at 647.
"In OPs. OHIo A'r'Y GEN. 1423 (1935) it was thought that newspapers published
1961]
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Perhaps a more realistic indication of how blue sky law administrators con-
strue their statutes was obtained by a private survey conducted by the
author. The following questionnaire was sent to forty-eight administra-
tors:
8
A. Do you believe that your Blue Sky Law is broad enough to cover
an offer or sale (or both) of securities in your state, solely via
the mails or some interstate facility, by a person in another state?
B. This question covers not only the case of the individual contract,
but also the situation involving advertisements from out-of-state
newspapers, radio and television stations and the like. Whatever
your answer, it would be helpful if the section or sections upon
which you rely were cited.
Replies were received from forty-two states. Three states to date have
solved the problem by adopting section 414 of the UNIFORM SECURI-
TIES ACT."1 Twenty-six state administrators answered "yes" to the entire
question, and of those twenty-six, sixteen referred to specific sections of
their statutes. "2 Four administrators believe that the answer to part "A"
is "yes", but that their respective statutes do not cover the case of out-of-
state newspapers, radio and the like. Again, of those four, three referred
out of state containing advertisements of securities did not violate the statute, and in OpS,
ORE. ATr'y GEN. 688 (1940) it was said that where Oregon residents address inquiries
about stocks to a New York corporation and where negotiations are carried on through the
mails culminating in a sale in New York, the New York corporation is not violating the
Oregon act. In Ops. CONN. ATT'Y GEN. 350 (1932) the writer believed that a broker
located out of state, offering or selling securities to persons located within the state, solely
via the mails was subject to the securities act. The New Mexico Attorney General, OPS.
N.M. ATT'y GEN. 38 (1933), although believing that sales via the mails within the state
were "technical" violations of the statute, did not believe that the state could exercise effec-
tive control over these transactions. An earlier opinion in OPS. MICH. ATT'y GEN. 621
(1955) was over-ruled in a later opinion in OPS. MICH. ATT'Y GEN. 465 (1957), where
it was held that non.resident dealers or brokers might not legally solicit persons in Michigan
by mails without being licensed as a securities dealer under the Michigan blue sky law. A
position similar to that of the Michigan Attorney General was taken in 23 Os. MD. ATrry
GEN. 138 (1938) and in 17 OPS. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 217 (1951).
"' Delaware and Nevada, which have no blue sky law, excepted. All correspondence
and other data relating to this survey have been turned over to the Harvard Law School
Lib rALASKA COMPILED LAWS ANN. 5 35-6-34 (Supp. 1959); ARK. STAT. 5 67-1260
(SuP?. 1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, SS 2(c), 2(f), 2(j) (2), 413 (Supp. 1959).
'ANN. CAL. CODES, CORPORATIONS CODE §§ 25009, 25500 (1955); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 125-1-3(2) (Supp. 1957); FLA. STAT. ANN. SS 517.02(3) (Supp. 1959);
ILL ANN. STAT. c. 121 , § 137.10 Supp. 1959); ANN. IND. STAT. SS 25-830, 25-831(c)
(1948); GEN. STAT. KAN. SS 17-1254, 17-1255, 17-1265 (Supp. 1959); LA. STAT.
ANN.-REV. STAT. 51:701(3) (1950); MASS. GEM. LAWS ANN. c. I10A, S 5 (1958);
MINN. STAT. ANN. SS 80.01(3), 80.18 (Supp. 1959); REV. STAT. NEB. §S 81-304,
81-315 (1950); N.J. STAT. ANN. 49:1-4 (1955); N.Y. GEN. BuSrNESS LAW S 352-b
(Supp. 1959); 70 PA. STAT. S 32(b) (Supp. 1958); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 48-1602(F)
(Supp. 1959); Riv. CODE WASH. S 21.20.005(9) (1959); WYO. STAT. S 17-103 (1957);
Ala., Ga., Md., Miss., Mo., N.M., Ore., R.I., Tex., Wis.
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to specific sections of their statutes.83 Seven administrators answered "no"
to the entire question, and four of the answers pointed to particular sec-
tions of their codes."4 The Iowa administrator believed that although the
act seemed broad enough to cover interstate solicitations and sales, there
was considerable doubt about the ability to enforce such violations.85 The
North Dakota statute relating to securities registration omits the words
"offer to sell", but the dealer section reads, "No dealer or salesman shall
offer for sale or sell any securities .. ."" In any event the North Dakota
blue sky administrator would answer "yes" to both parts of the question,
but only as to out-of-state newspapers having a "substantial circulation"
in the state, as to television offers."
The results, then, suggest that a large majority of the administrators
are in favor of a construction of their statutes which would first, indicate
that offers directed into the regulating state are made in that state,89 and
second, that the offers and sales so made in the state are covered by their
blue sky laws.
Conclusion.
There are a number of analogies which can be and have been drawn
in support of the state's power to regulate offers and sales of securities."
03REV. LAWS HAWAII §§ 199-6, 199-11, 199-16, 199-17, 199-20 (1955); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 61-1-4(3) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 55 4202, 4205, 4213, 4224
(1958); Ohio.
"IDAHO CODE §5 26-1801, 26-1815 (1947); REV. STAT. ME. c. 59, S 228 (1959);
W.VA. CODE § 3273 (12) (1955); Ariz., Conn., S.D., S.C.
"Letter from Robert L. Walters, Superintendent of Securities to the author, March 22,
1960.
0N.D. REV. CODE 5 10.0404 (Supp. 1957). This is to be corrected at the present
session of the North Dakota legislature, according to a letter from C. L. Hughes, Securities
Commissioner, to the author, March 21, 1960.
"N.D. RE .CODE S 10.0410 (Supp. 1957).
"Letter from C. L. Hughes to the author, March 21, 1960.
Both the Michigan and the Texas administrators expressed agreement with this
proposition. Letter from C. Hayes, Assistant Commissioner, to the author, March 23, 1960,
and letter from W. King, Securities Commissioner, to the author, Jan. 28, 1960.
'Loss & COWEmT, BLUE SKY LAW 215-221 (1958). For example, the authors point
to the criminal law analogies: It is generally held, assuming that the facts otherwise disclose
an offense committed within the jurisdiction, that the court is not deprived of jurisdiction
by mere absence of the defendant from the state at the time the offense was committed:
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916);
Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890); United
States v. Steinberg, 62 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 729 (1933); Ex
parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 108 (1866); State v. Tickle, 238 N.C. 206, 77 S.E.2d 632 (1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 938 (1954). See also RESTATEMENT, SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAWS
S 43F(1) (e), comment at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). In the law of torts, the conflicts
rinciple is that the court must look to the law of the state where the last event necessary
fr liability takes place: Aetna Freight Lines v. R. C. Tway Co., Ky., 298 S.W.2d 293
(1956); RESTATEMENT CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-379 (1934). Finally, the provisions
of the SEC statutes on registration of securities and broker-dealers apply to offers sent from
a foreign country into the United States by use of the mails; Loss, SEcuRIIES REGULA-
TION 1172-1173 (1951).
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Perhaps, though, the problem is not as troublesome as it once was. In the
first place, there is the problem of where the offer was made. All but one
of the cases in this area have assumed that where the offer is made via the
mails or the telephone, it was made in the state where it was received. It
is submitted that Doherty may be distinguished in future cases, possibly
on the ground that it was the customer, and not the broker, who took the
initiative in that case. Second, while nearly no state blue sky law expressly
so provides (with the exception of those states which have adopted section
414 of the UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT), the cases appear to either
assume,91 or hold,"2 that such offers or sales made within the state come
within the purview of that state's securities law. Third, while none of the
cases above raised the point, it seems clear that the offering and selling of
stock by a foreign corporation within a state does not come under the so-
called "internal affairs" rule,98 a rule which says that a state has no "visi-
torial" powers over foreign corporations and that its courts will not inter-
fere in their internal affairs and management.9 '
Last is the constitutional issue. In spite of the uncertainties which
might still exist on this question, it is submitted that today there are no
constitutional objections when a state seeks to regulate interstate solicita-
tions and sales, made within its boundaries. If a straight "governmental
interest" test is adopted, that test appears to be satisfied. It is well settled
that a state has a sufficient concern to protect its citizenry from "specula-
tive schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'"
or "to stop the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells,
distant gold mines and other like fraudulent exploitations."' Moreover,
it does not seem likely that, even on the "weighing of interest" test, a
different result would be reached. There does not seem to be any need for
the application of a single law in this instance. It has been suggested that
" Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n,
339 U.S. 643 (1950); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Wrigley
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Cameron, 16 F.2d 290 (M.D. Pa. 1926); Hardy v. Musicraft Records,
Inc., 93 Cal.App.2d 698, 209 P.2d 839 (1949).
'2 Traveller's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n,
188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949).
"London, Paris & American Bank v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 601, 609 (9th Cir. 1902),
cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902): "It is true the courts in California cannot control the
internal affairs of any foreign corporation. Such matters are to be conducted in pursuance
of and in compliance with the provisions of the charter of the foreign corporation, and the
laws of the country where it was created; but in the management and method of its business
affairs in California with the citizens and residents thereof, in the sale or disposition or
transfer of the shares of stock, it must conform to the laws of California in relation to
such matters, ..." (Emphasis added.) See also Williams v. Gaylord, 186 U.S. 157
(1902); Gillis v. Pan American Western Petroleum Co., 3 Cal.2d 249, 44 P.2d 311
(1935); Biddle v. Smith, 148 Tenn. 489, 256 S.W. 453 (1923).
" See, e.g. Kelly v. American Sugar Refining Co., 139 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 791 (1944).
"Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
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there is no reason why, when a corporation is performing an act that an
individual is also capable of performing (e.g. offering and selling stock to
the public), the purchaser's rights ought not to vary depending on the
state in which he deals with the corporation."
Therefore, if the proposition is accepted that a state has a sufficient
interest in the protection of its citizens with respect to stock schemes, that
interest ought constitutionally to support its regulating offers and sales via
the mails; and, logically, that power ought to extend even to the case of
the single offer, or the isolated sale, no matter what the medium may
happen to be." As the survey shows, a great majority of the state admin-
istrators construe their statutes to reach these limits. In considering this
proffered opinion, however, it might be remembered that the Supreme
Court has only sustained statutes in the cases of companies which carried
on a continuous selling effort in the regulating state.
The Uniform Securities Act."
The Act, in section 414, provides that an offer is "made in this state"
both when the offer "originates from this state" or "is directed by the
offeror to this state.""9 This solves the uncertainty of the question of where
the offer is "made", pointed up especially by Doherty. The section puts a
special emphasis on the interest of the individual in compliability and fair-
ness, when it excludes from its definition of "offer" newspapers published
outside the state, and radio and television program originating outside the
state.1"' However, it is still possible for the newspaper or the television
station to violate the statute if it accepts an "offer to buy"-made as a
result of the advertisement-"in this state".1"' The section represents a
maximizing both of the state's interest in regulation and protection, and
the individual's interest in certainty and a "just" application of the law. 0 '
" Reese and Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the
Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1124 (1958).
"The case of Hardy v. Musicraft Records, Inc., 93 Cal.App.2d 698, 209 P.2d 839
(1949), which appear to be an instance of an isolated sale, may support this proposition.
"' Loss & CowETr, op. cit. supra note 90 at 224-229.
" 5 414(c).
too 414(e).
to'S 414(d).
'See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401 (c) (4) which excludes from the defini-
tion of "Broker-Dealer" any person "who has no place of business in this state if .. .
during any period of twelve consecutive months he does not direct more than fifteen
offers to sell or buy into this state ... whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is
then present in this state." and 5 401 (f) (6) which makes the same exclusion for "Invest-
ment adviser," fixing the number at five, instead of fifteen, and using the term "business
communications" instead of "offers to sell or buy." These two sections have been
adopted by: ALASKA COMPILED LAWS ANN. §5 35-6-21(c), 35-6-21(f) (Supp. 1959);
ARK. STAT. SS 67-1247(c), 67-1247(f) (Supp. 1959); REv. LAWS HAWAII S5 199-1(c),
199-1(f) (1955); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 55 2(c) 2(f) (Supp. 1959). CODE VA.
S 13.1-501(c) (1950), adopts with some changes, § 401(c); and, N.M. STAT. 5 48-18-
17(h) (Supp. 1959), adopts with only a slight change, S 401(f).
